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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of the last few decades resulted in an 
increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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It is a paradox of the contemporary period that, at a time, when more and more states all 
over the world have adopted democratic forms and procedures, there is decreasing trust in 
elected officials and politicians. This lack of trust is reflected in growing political apathy, 
declining membership in political parties, and low voter turn out in elections. At the same 
time, however, there appears to be more trust in civil society groups, which are often, 
wrongly in my view, equated with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). These 
groups, which are supposedly independent of the state and of big companies, are not 
elected; they are voluntary groups composed of committed individuals. They have 
become much more publicly prominent in the last decade and are often seen as the 
expression of public morality. 
 
This paper is about whether this trust is justified in relation to the world’s poorest people. 
I shall use the term moral accountability to refer to the responsibility of civil society 
groups and individuals, concerned with relief and development, towards the people they 
are trying to help. This sort of accountability is sometimes described as political 
responsibility (Jordan and Tuijl) or as external accountability (Anheier).  By procedural 
accountability, I mean the formal mechanisms adopted by civil society groups for 
management purposes. This kind of accountability involves responsibility towards 
stakeholders - donors, boards or trustees, members or supporters, staff, as well as clients. 
Thus moral accountability is roughly equated with political and external accountability, 
while procedural accountability can be equated with management or internal 
accountability. 
 
It is often said that civil society groups have a ‘voice not a vote’ (Edwards 2000). They 
are not representative and do not claim to be representative. Their internal forms of   3
management are irrelevant to their role in the public arena since what matters is what 
they have to say not whether they are internally democratic or representative. The 
problem arises, however, when there are conflicts between internal and external 
accountability, political and management imperatives. There are cases, in the 
humanitarian field, for example, or in the case of biotechnology, where NGOs have used 
their ‘voice’ to convey misleading information, which has the effect of mobilising 
political and indeed financial support. There are other cases where groups claim to 
represent the very poor in order to raise funds from outside donors. In this paper, I shall 
investigate the relation between moral and procedural accountability for different types of 
civil society groups and what this means in terms of improving the ways in which the 
needs and concerns of poor people are expressed. 
 
In the first part of the paper, I shall provide a brief historical overview of the concept of 
civil society and the relevance of different meanings to the notion of ‘voice’ as it relates 
to poor people. In the second part, I shall outline a typology of civil society actors that 
might be helpful in clarifying different forms of accountability. And in the last section, I 
will draw some conclusions and policy recommendations about the accountability of 
different types of civil society groups. 
 
What is Civil Society? 
 
The contemporary term ‘civil society’ has its origins in the early modern period, the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The term, of course, had appeared earlier. Like all 
Western political concepts, it can be traced back to Greek political philosophy. Aristotle 
talked about politike koinona  (political community/society) to refer to a rule-governed 
society in which the ruler puts the public good before his (not usually her) private 
interest. The term was translated into Latin as Societas Civilis. 
 
The renaissance of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was 
inextricably linked to theories of individual rights and the idea of a social contract. What 
was new about the early modern usage of the term was the assumption of human equality,   4
drawn from Christianity. A civil society was a society where individuals come to together 
to make a social contract and the outcome of that contract is expressed in the rule of law 
and the existence of a state, which is also subject to the law. Juridical equality applied 
both to rulers and the ruled. ‘When a King has dethroned himself and put himself in a 
state of war with his people,’ wrote John Locke ‘what shall hinder them from prosecuting 
him who is King, as they would any other man, who has put himself in a state of war with 
them?’ (quoted in Goldwin, 1987, p 507) 
 
At that time, there was no distinction between civil society and the state. A civil society 
was more or less the same thing as a political society. Civil society was contrasted not 
with the state but with other kinds of society –despotic empires, for example, or the state 
of nature. In particular, a civil society was a peaceful society, a society in which people 
treated strangers with civility, in contrast to other violent and ‘rude’ societies. 
 
The Scottish enlightenment thinkers were to augment the concept with their emphasis on 
the importance of commercial society. They saw the market as the condition for 
individualism and the existence of a civil society. But they still understood civil society 
in much the same terms as a rule-governed society based on the consent of individuals in 
contrast to the state of nature, where there were no rules, or with despotic systems where 
rules were imposed through coercion. (See Ferguson) 
 
It was Hegel who was first to use the term as something distinct from the state. Hegel, 
who was strongly influenced by the Scottish political economists, defined civil society as 
‘the realm of difference, intermediate between the family and the state.’(Hegel 1996 
p.185-6). In other words, civil society was equated with the economy. Hegel used the 
term ‘bourgeois society’ (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft) and this was the definition to be 
taken up by Marx and later nineteenth century thinkers. For Hegel famously, civil society 
was ‘the achievement of the modern world…. the territory of mediation where there is 
free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and 
where waves of passion gush forth, regulated only by reason, glinting through   5
them.’(Hegel, pp) Thus the state was viewed as a mediator, resolving the conflicts of civil 
society; the civil servants were the ‘universal class’ acting in the public interest. 
 
Although de Tocqueville used the term civil society in an eighteenth century sense to 
refer to a rule-governed society, his contribution needs to be mentioned because of the 
importance he attributed to associationalism and self-organisation, which informs so 
much of contemporary thinking, especially in the United States. In his study of 
democracy in America, he was greatly impressed by the extent of associations in civil life 
and put forward the argument those active associations were a condition for freedom and 
equality. As the state takes over more and more functions of daily life, as the division of 
labour becomes more complex and as demands for the redistribution of wealth increase, 
an active voluntary sector is necessary to provide a check on state power. ’As soon as 
several inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling they wish to 
promote in the world, they look for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found 
one another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a 
power seen from afar, whose actions serve for example and whose language is listened 
to…Among the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more 
precise and clear than all the others. If men are to remain civilised or to become so, the 
art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio as the equality of 
conditions is increased.’(Tocqueville, p.114)  
  
 For Marx and Engels, political associations were a reflection of material conditions. 
They were to take up the Hegelian concept of Bürgerliche Gesellschaft and to emphasise 
the role of the economy. According to Marx, the ‘material conditions of life are summed 
up by Hegel after the fashion of the English and the French of the eighteenth century 
under the name “civil society”; the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political 
economy.’(Quoted in Bobbio, p78) Unlike Hegel, however, Marx and Engels argued that 
the state was subordinate to civil society; they saw the state as an instrument or apparatus 
in the hands of the dominant classes. Civil society was the ‘theatre of history…Civil 
Society embraces all the material relations of individuals within a definite stage of the 
development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life   6
of a given stage and, hence, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand 
again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must 
organise itself as state.’(quoted in Bobbio, p.82) 
 
In the twentieth century, the content of the concept has been further narrowed to forms of 
social interaction that are distinct from both the state and the market. Writing in prison, 
the Italian Marxist, Gramsci called into question the economism of the Marxist definition 
of civil society. According to Gramsci, it is not ‘economic structure’ as such that governs 
political action but the ‘interpretation of it.’ Thus the ‘theatre of history’ is not the story 
of economic development but of ideological and cultural struggles. Gramsci drew an 
important distinction between coercion and consent, domination and hegemony. 
Bourgeois society had established a powerful set of norms and institutions to sustain the 
hegemony of bourgeois rule based on the consent of the working classes. Whereas 
capitalism was overthrown in Russia through the capture of the state, this was not 
possible in the west where ‘there was a proper relation between state and civil society, 
and when the state trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.’ 
(Quoted in Ehrenberg, p.209) Hence, he was to emphasis the need for political activism 
in the realms of education, media and other institutions of civil society.   
 
In contemporary usage, it is possible broadly to distinguish three different versions of 
usages of the term: 
 
The first version is what I call the ‘activist’ version. This is the version that initiated the 
contemporary revival of the term in both Latin America and Eastern Europe. The term 
emerged simultaneously in the 1970s and 1980s, and as far as I know without any 
communication, in these two regions as a way of describing the efforts to create 
autonomous public spaces in the context of authoritarian states –military dictatorships in 
Latin America and totalitarian Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In Latin America, 
the intellectuals who used the term were strongly influenced both by Gramsci (via the 
Spanish and Italian Communist parties) and by the ideas of liberation theology -–the 
notion of the conscientisation of the poor, overcoming the ‘culture of silence’ (Howell   7
and Pearce, Lewis).  In Eastern Europe, the term arose out of the failure of the Prague 
spring and the loss of faith that any change could come ‘from above’ or through 
overthrow of the regime. The idea was that instead of trying to change the state, it was 
important to change the relation between state and society, to create self-organised 
institutions, independent of the state that could challenge the reach of the state (Michnik). 
Terms like ‘antipolitics’ (Havel and Konrad) or ‘living in truth’ (Havel) expressed the 
same idea. In both Latin America and Eastern Europe, these new autonomous spaces 
depended on transnational links, and this was even before the advent of Internet. It was 
both the existence of formal international instruments like the Conventions on Human 
Rights or the Helsinki Agreement and the links with peace and human rights groups in 
Western countries that helped to open up spaces in these countries (Keck and Sikkink, 
Kaldor 1991). 
 
This understanding of civil society was to be taken up by intellectuals in Europe and the 
United States, as well as other parts of the world especially India, to mean the ‘new 
politics’ (Arato and Cohen, Kothari). It referred to the idea of a realm outside political 
parties where individuals and groups aimed to democratise the state, to redistribute 
power, rather than to capture power in a traditional sense. It was associated with the so-
called new social movements that emerged after 1968, concerned with peace the 
environment, women, human rights and so on. It involved an effort to create a public 
space where individuals can act and communicate freely, independent of both the state 
and capitalism. According to the German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas: 
‘The expression “civil society” has in the meantime taken on a meaning different from 
that of the “bourgeois society” of the liberal tradition, which Hegel conceptualised as the 
“system of needs”, that is, as a market system involving social labour and commodity 
exchange. What is meant by “civil society” today, in contrast to its usage in the Marxist 
tradition, no longer includes the economy as constituted by private law and steered 
through markets in labour, capital and commodities. Rather, its institutional core 
comprises those non-governmental and non-economic connections and voluntary 
associations that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society 
component of the life-world. Civil society is composed of those more or less   8
spontaneously emergent associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned to how 
societal problems resonate in private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions to the 
public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that 
institutionalises problem-solving discourses of general interest inside the framework of 
organised public spheres. These "discursive designs" have an egalitarian, open form of 
organisation that mirrors essential features of the kind of communication around which 
they crystallise and to which they lend continuity and permanence.’(Quoted in 
Ehrenberg, p.222-3). 
 
The second version of the term ‘civil society’ can be described as the ‘neo-liberal’ 
version. This version is much associated with ideas about the ‘third sector’ or the ‘non-
profit sector’ that developed in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. (Etzioni, Levitt, 
Anheier and Salamon). The idea is that, in the United States, there is a group of 
organisations that are neither controlled by the state nor the market, but which play an 
essential role in facilitating the operation of both. This concept owes much to the 
Tocquevillian emphasis on associationalism and is linked to neo-liberal ideas about 
minimising the role of the state. NGOs, NPOs (non-profit organisations), charities and 
voluntary associations are more flexible and innovative than the state. They can substitute 
for the state, in providing social services for example; they can check abuses of the state 
and poor governmental practises; and they can call corporations to account. The ideas of 
Robert Putnam about social capital and Francis Fukuyama about trust are in line with this 
version of civil society – the notion that trust and social interaction are essential 
ingredients of good governance and properly functioning markets. 
 
It is argued by civil society theorists like Ernest Gellner that it is this version that was 
taken up by Western donors in the early 1990s. Civil society was needed as a cushion 
against the shocks associated with structural adjustment, to provide a social safety net, for 
example, at a time when public services were being cut, and to foster good governance. 
Market failures and economic crises like those in Asia, were attributed to failures of 
governance, especially corruption. Civil society, it was hoped, could correct this. 
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A third version of civil society is the ‘post-modern’ version. The revival of the term civil 
society has been criticised by anthropologists from a relativist position. Both activist and 
neo-liberal versions, it is contended, are a western discourse. Comaroff and Comaroff 
talk about the way civil society has become a ‘neo-modern’ myth, with its own 
legitimising narrative. They talk about the ‘archaeology’ of civil society ‘usually told, 
layer upon layer, as a chronological epic of ideas and authors’ starting with an ‘origin 
story’ in the late 1700s. Outside Western Europe and North America, it is contended, 
civil society, in the sense of individual rights and voluntary associations never extended 
much beyond a few capital cities (Mamdani, Koonings and Krujit, Hann and Dunn). Yet 
there exist various traditional and neo-traditional organisations, based on kinship or 
religion that remain autonomous from the state and offer alternative sites of power or 
autonomous spaces. In Iran, for example, ‘various religious and bazaar institutions and 
groupings, under powerful molla patrons, and the duality of state power between the 
presidency and the spiritual leadership, constitute some plurality of power as compared 
with neighbouring states.’ (Zubaida, p.244) 
 
It is usually argued that these groups cannot be included in the concept of civil society 
because they may be compulsory associations and they are often mechanisms for social 
control, especially the oppression of women. But the post-modernists suggest that there 
cannot be an arbitrary division between ‘good’ westernised civil society and ‘bad’ 
traditional uncivil society.  
 
Thus the post-modern version of civil society would argue for a more culturally sensitive 
concept, which involves various national and religious groupings and a contestation of 
narratives. The Turkish Islamicist Ali Bulac, for example, promotes the idea of a civil 
society characterised by self-governing communities based on religion, with a minimalist 
state. This idea, which has parallels with the Ottoman millet system, involves tolerance of 
different religions and indeed secularism but at the same time, but it lacks the 
individualism of Western models of civil society since the individual is bound by his or 
her community. As Zubaida points out, this notion represents an ‘odd mixture of 
communitarian corporatism and libertarianism’. (Zubaida, p.238).   10
 
Underlying these different meanings, both historically and in the contemporary period, 
there is, I would contend, a common core of meaning. Civil society always meant a rule 
governed society based on the consent of individuals. In the early versions, the term 
referred to the whole of society including the state. Different meanings of civil society, I 
would argue, reflect the different ways in which consent was negotiated and reproduced. 
Civil society could be described as those organisations, groups and movements who are 
engaged in this process of negotiation and debate about the character of the rules – it is 
the process of expressing ‘voice’. In the nineteenth century, it was the ‘voice’ of the 
bourgeoisie that was shaping the liberal state; hence the identification of civil society as 
bourgeois society. With the rise of labour movements, the terrain shifted to struggles of 
worker organisations in relation both to the state and to capital; at that time, political 
parties could also be viewed as part of civil society. By joining a trades union or a 
political party, the ‘voices’ of individual workers could be heard.  
 
To-day, civil society is transnational engaged in a process of debate and negotiation with 
governments, companies and international organisations. Moreover, the groups involved 
have extended beyond urban elites to include women, indigenous groups and other 
excluded people. The differing contemporary meanings, I would argue, reflect different 
political perspectives about the goals of the process of negotiation. For the neo-liberals, 
the goal is to export the Western, or even more specifically the American model of 
governance. For the activist, the goal is emancipation, a radical extension of democracy 
in the West as well as the South, a goal that is linked to notions of global justice. The 
post-modernists are sceptical about the goal-oriented nature of modernity; they would see 
the contestation that is currently taking place on a global scale as a way of breaking with 
grand narratives, teleological political projects that were associated with nation states. 
The rise of the Internet allows for a riot of virtuality and for a denial of the existence of 
something called the real. 
 
In my view, civil society has to include all the groupings that are included in the different 
versions – the relatively passive ‘third sector’ of the neo-liberal version, the social   11
movements of the activist version, as well as the neo-traditional groupings of the post-
modern version. It is true that the neo-traditional formation may not provide a voice for 
individuals because of their communitarian nature and, indeed may engage in various 
forms of coercion and violence. But actually existing civil society has to contend with 
these troublesome and contradictory issues; if it is to be an inclusive concept, it has to 
include the exclusive. For the purposes of this report, the goal is closest to the activist 
version –the emancipation of the poorest people. But the degree to which civil society 
expresses this goal, that is to say, constitutes a voice for the poorest people, can only be 
investigated by including all these various groupings. What James Putzel calls the ‘dark 
side of social capital’ has to be incorporated as well. 
  
The Actors of Civil Society 
 
There is, to day, a proliferation of language used to describe the non-state actors in global 
politics: social movements; NGOs and NPOs; advocacy networks; civil society 
organisations; public policy or epistemic networks; to name but a few. In what follows, I 
shall distinguish four ideal types, in a Weberian sense. They are not actually distinct 
types since they overlap with each other. But they are useful for thinking about different 
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The first type of civil society actor is social movements. Like civil society, there is a 
range of definitions of social movements but it is generally agreed that social movements 
are organisations, groups of people, individuals, who act together to bring about 
transformation in society. They are contrasted with, for example, more tightly organised 
NGOs or political parties. The social movement theorist, Sydney Tarrow says that social 
movements are an ‘invention of the modern age and an accompaniment to the rise of the 
modern state.’ At the base of all social movements are what he calls ‘contentious politics’ 
– action, which is ‘used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the 
name of new or unaccepted claims and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge 
others or authorities.’(Tarrow, p.3) 
 
Social movements rise and fall. Their success depends both on their capacity to mobilise 
and on the responsiveness of authorities. To the extent that authorities facilitate protest,   13
then social movements are ‘tamed’, integrated into the political process and 
institutionalised. ‘Taming’ is not just about access; it is about adaptation on both sides. 
The authorities accept part of the agenda of protest; the movements modify their demands 
and become respectable. To the extent that authorities repress protest and reject demands, 
social movements are marginalised and may turn to violence. Tarrow talks about cycles 
of contention; although the endings may differ, social movements do always come to an 
end: 
‘Each time they appear, the world seems to be turning upside down. But just as regularly, 
the erosion of mobilisation, the polarisation between sectors of the movements, the splits 
between institutionalisation and violence, and elites selective use of incentives and 
repression combine to bring the cycle to an end. At its height, the movement is electric 
and seems irresistible, but it is eroded and integrated through the political 
process.’(Tarrow, p.175) 
 
In the twentieth century, it is possible to talk about three waves of social movements. The 
first wave was labour and self-determination or anti-colonial movements. The second 
wave was what theorists of social movements call ‘new’ social movements. These are the 
movements that emerged after 1968 and were contrasted with the first wave of ‘old’ 
movements. The third wave is the most recent and is often described as the ‘anti-
globalisation’ movement, even though only a minority of activists actually want to 
reverse globalisation.  
 
The ‘new’ movements after 1968 were concerned with new issues –human rights, gender, 
third world solidarity, the environment or peace. In Europe and North America, they were 
less concerned with social justice than ‘old’ movements although this was not true of 
movements in the South where concerns about the environment or the position of women 
were directly related to development issues. They expressed the political frustrations of a 
new educated middle class or brain workers – ICT specialists or the caring professions 
(doctors, lecturers, social workers) generated by post-industrialism and the welfare state 
(Touraine).  In contrast to the hierarchical mass membership organisations, which were 
characteristic of ‘old’ movements, they pioneered new forms of horizontal organisation   14
and new forms of protest, making use of the media, especially television. Whereas the 
‘old’ movements aimed at persuading states to act and in the process helped to strengthen 
them, the ‘new’ movements are much more concerned about individual autonomy, about 
resisting the state’s intrusion into everyday life (Melucci 1988 and 1996). Claus Offe has 
argued that the ‘new’ movements represent a demand for radical democracy. ‘Among the 
principal innovations of the new movements of the new movements, in contrast with the 
workers’ movement, are a critical ideology in relation to modernism and progress; 
decentralised and participatory organisational structures; defence of interpersonal 
solidarity against the great bureaucracies; and the reclamation of autonomous spaces 
rather than material advantages.’(Quoted in Della Porta and Diani, p.12)  
 
It is sometimes also argued that the ‘old’ movements are ‘national’ in contrast to the 
cosmopolitan character of the ‘new’ social movements.  But the ‘old’ movements were 
not originally national. The labour movement was always an international movement. 
The first international of labour was held in 1864; workers travelled to different countries 
to express solidarity with their fellow workers from the late nineteenth century onwards; 
the International Federation of Trades Unions was founded in 1901. Self-determination or 
anti-colonial movements always appealed to universalistic conceptions of rights. The 
identification of ‘old’ movements as national is the consequence of the cycle of 
contention. ‘Old’ movements did primarily address the state, although not exclusively, 
but it was through the state that ‘old’ movements were ‘tamed’. These movements were 
transformed into political parties and, in the case of trades unions, into negotiating 
partners for states and employers at a national level. The mass character of the ‘old’ 
movements, their vertical and hierarchical forms of organisation, are all perhaps 
explainable in terms of the organisational norms of industrial, bureaucratic and military 
society.  
 
It can be argued that the growth of NGOs in the 1990s in part reflected the ‘taming’ of 
the new social movements. In contrast to ‘old’ social movements, they were ‘tamed’ not 
within a national framework but within the framework of global governance, as I shall 
argue below. The third wave of social movements that emerged at the very end of the   15
century can be viewed as a reaction to the ‘taming’ of the second wave. It involves a 
revival of the preoccupations with social justice characteristic of the first wave but makes 
use of many of the methods of the second wave. It brings together elements of the ‘new’ 
social movements and their ‘tamed’ successors, NGOs, concerned with women’s issues, 
development or the environment. It involves students and brainworkers, like the second 
wave movements.  But it also embraces landless peasant movements, as in Brazil, and 
indigenous people’s movements like the Zapatistas, or the tribal people in India, as well 
as what might be called the ‘new’ labour movement. The ‘new’ labour movement 
includes: international trade union federations, who have been forced to reform after the 
Cold War when their activities were hamstrung by ideological divisions; new social 
movement unions in Brazil, South Africa or Korea; new forms of labour organisations 
like homeworkers in India or African township traders; as well as labour oriented grass 
roots groups and NGO’s in various parts of the world. There is beginning to be a sea 
change in labour movement attitudes; the functions of unions are being reconceptualised 
away from an economistic preoccupation with wages towards new notions of labour 
rights; and methods of organising are becoming more like ‘new’ social movements.  
 
The second ideal type are NGOs. NGOs are often known as the ‘non-profit sector’ in the 
United States or Japan or as charities and voluntary associations in Britain.  Anheier says 
that NGOs are organisations that are organised, private, non-profit distributing, self-
governing and voluntary. The growth of NGOs has been described by Lester Salamon as 
the ‘global associational revolution’. The Johns Hopkins Survey of the non-profit sector 
in 22 countries showed that this sector had contributed significantly to employment 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s. The sector accounts for some 5.1% of total employment 
in the countries surveyed and some 10.4million volunteers, bringing the total to 7.1% of 
total employment. (Anheier) NGOs vary from large-scale NGOs organised both on 
corporate lines and on bureaucratic lines, to small-scale local NGOs. Some of the biggest 
NGOs are in the development and relief field, where there are some eight market leaders, 
each with a budget of roughly $500 million a year; they include famous names like 
Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children or CARE (Hulme and Edwards).  
   16
The term NGO has an international connotation. The term was first used in Article 71 of 
the UN Charter, where the Economic and Social Committee is empowered ‘to make 
suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are 
concerned with matters in its competence.’(Gordenker and Weiss, p.22) Already, 
international NGOs (INGOs) were established in the nineteenth century. The most 
famous examples are probably the Anti-Slavery Society (1839) and the International Red 
Cross (1864). By 1874, there were 32 registered INGOs and this had increased 1083 by 
1914 although not all survived (Chatfield). INGOs were instrumental in setting up 
international institutions, during this period, many of which began as non-governmental 
institutions (Charnowitz). They also influenced treaty making, particularly in the case of 
anti-slavery and many of the techniques that INGOs use today were pioneered during this 
period, particularly parallel fora at inter-governmental conferences.  
 
In the inter-war period, INGOs were very active in the League of Nations up to 1935 and 
in the International Labour Organisation, which even today includes delegates from 
trades unions, employer organisations and women’s groups in its formal structures, 
alongside governmental organisations. According to Charnowitz, the two most influential 
groups were the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), 
founded in World War I, which moved its headquarters to Geneva, and the International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
 
The number of INGOs increased during the post-war period not only under the 
stimulation of new social movements but also as former missionaries and colonial 
administrators sought new occupations. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, however, their 
influence was constrained by the Cold War and the statist character of many of the post-
war international institutions. It was not until the 1970’s that the opening up of access for 
‘new’ social movements to local and international institutions led to the proliferation of 
both NGOs in general and INGOs in particular. Initially, this opening up applied mainly 
to ‘soft’ issues that did not seem to engage directly with the ideological conflict, mainly 
the environment and women. The Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 
1972 marked the beginning of the parallel summit as a way of organising global civil   17
society organisations on particular issues. Likewise, a series of world conferences on 
women helped to galvanise women’s groups – Mexico City 1975, Copenhagen 1980, 
Nairobi 1985 and Beijing 1995 (Chen 1997).  By the 1980’s, development and 
humanitarian NGOs also began to be seen as partners for governments and international 
institutions for a variety of reasons; their local knowledge, the need to bypass ineffective 
or authoritarian governments, and the need to find ways to implement structural 
adjustment packages.  
 
The end of the Cold War accelerated these tendencies. It was no longer possible to ally 
with authoritarian governments in the context of a wave of support for democratisation 
and human rights. As the ideological conflict dissolved, governments and international 
institutions became more responsive to peace and human rights groups. In the second half 
of the 1990’s, ‘third way’ politicians came to power in Western Europe, who accepted the 
neo-liberal orthodoxy, but nevertheless had learned their politics through the experience 
of new social movements and were ready to pursue new issues and to open up the 
corridors of power to ‘tamed’ social movements. Finally, in the late 1990s, even the 
international financial institutions, like the World Bank, the WTO or the IMF, but 
especially the World Bank began a dialogue with INGOs (O’Brien et al). 
 
These openings have encouraged institutionalisation and professionalisation, the 
transformation of social movements into NGOs or INGOs. During the 1990s, registered 
INGOS increased by one third, from 10,292 to 13,206 and their memberships increased 
from 155,000 to 263,000 over the same period (Global Civil Society 2001). Funding by 
official agencies and private foundations have led to the development of a market for 
NGOs, in which donors influence the culture and management style of NGOs and 
successful NGOs transform themselves into a kind of oligopoly.  OECD figures show 
that, by the end of the 1990s, some 5% of all official aid is channelled through NGOs, 
with differing shares for different countries. Some 85% of Swedish aid is channelled 
through NGOs and some 10% of UK aid. 
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NGOs are both service providers and advocacy groups. Services include relief in 
emergencies, primary health care, non-formal education, housing and legal services, and 
provision of micro-credit as well as training to other service providers. Korten suggests 
that NGOs follow a typical cycle, moving from concern with immediate relief, to projects 
concerned with local development, to advocacy relating to the wider institutional and 
policy context. But others have argued that the cycle may work the other way round as 
‘new’ social movements acting primarily as advocates transform themselves into service 
providers to gain credibility among local populations or as a way of ensuring their 
survival (See Lewis). 
 
NGOs, as a consequence both of their ‘tamed’ character and of their experience as 
service providers are able to act as interlocutors on issues with which new social 
movements are concerned. In addition, many have built up expert knowledge on 
particular policy areas, which enables them to challenge the official experts. This is why 
think tanks and international Commissions should be included in this category. Like 
many of the NGOs, think tanks are a source of alternative expert knowledge. 
International Commissions are another ‘taming’ device in which independent groups of 
prominent individuals and experts are brought together to produce reports on issues of 
global significance. The Brandt and Brundlandt Commissions pioneered this approach on 
development and the environment respectively. In the 1990s, this type of commission has 
proliferated – for example, the World Commission on Dams (WCD). 
 
It is sometimes argued that NGOs and think tanks are predominantly Western. It is 
certainly true that the culture and organisation of NGOs has been influenced by Western 
models and that much funding is Western. But it is also the case that NGOs are a 
worldwide phenomenon and some of the largest NGOs, like the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) are to be found in the South. In the 1990s, a new 
phenomenon has been the emergence of global networks, which involve NGOs, social 
movements, as well as grass roots groups coming together to campaign around particular 
issues, like land mines or HIV/AIDS. 
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The third type of civil society actor are what I call social organisations. Properly 
speaking, they should be included in the category NGOs. They conform to the description 
given by Anheier. But I have counted them as a separate category because their aims, 
internal organisation and funding differs from what we typically consider to be NGOs. 
By social organisations, I mean organisations representing particular sectors of society 
defined in social terms rather than in cultural or religious terms. Thus this category 
typically includes professional organisations – societies of lawyers, doctors, employers, 
trades unions or farmers- community groups of women or youth, for example, as well as 
groups of disabled people, displaced persons and refugees, homeless people, land less 
labourers or groups of tribespersons. These organisations rarely receive outside funding 
and are largely dependent on the resources of members. Many of these groups represent 
poor people and, thus, their goals are similar to those of the development and relief 
NGOs. But the goals are concrete, expressed in terms of the interests of members, rather 
than abstract. Social organisations are not new even in the South; they can be traced back 
to the guilds and trade associations of the middle ages, which existed in urban areas in the 
Middle East and Asia as well as Europe even if their voluntary nature was less assured.  
 
This type of organisation is an expression of the structure of society and it changes as 
society changes. The period of the 1990s has been a period of rapid structural changes 
both because of globalisation and IMF policies, and because of rapid technological 
change especially the introduction of ICT. Many of the traditional social organisations 
have been eroded and their political links broken; this is especially true of trades unions 
and farmers organisations. On the other hand, new organisations have been developing to 
defend the rights of the victims of rapid structural change, although these, of course, are 
as yet weak. Such groups include movements of people in areas threatened by dam 
construction, like the Narmada valley, new organisations of informal workers as 
described above, organisations of refugees and displaced persons like the Srebrenica 
women.  
 
The fourth and final category is national or religious groups. These are organisations 
based on particular sections of society, defined in terms of culture, kin or religion.   20
Although numbers are not available, these groups and movements have increased 
dramatically during the 1990s and in many countries they have reached positions of 
power. They are sometimes described as neo-traditional groups although they have 
generally been reconstructed in the context of globalisation and with the use of Internet 
and other new technologies.  In some respects, these movements are similar to ‘old’ 
social movements, in that they are often mass movements, which include workers and 
peasants as well as the middle classes; and they are organised in traditional hierarchical 
ways, often with charismatic leaders. But they differ from ‘old’ nationalist movements, 
movements for self-determination, in certain important ways. First, they tend to be either 
movements based on exclusive identity politics, that is to say, they are claims to political 
power on the basis of a label, generally ethnic, which excludes and is indeed hostile 
towards others with a different label. Or they are movements based on exclusive 
missionary politics, that is to say, claims to political power on the basis of religious 
practise, which also excludes others with different or non-religious practises. Self-
determination movements were about democracy, participation and rights not about 
ethnicity or religion, about inclusion within the framework of a nation-state. The ‘new’ 
nationalist movements tend to be authoritarian and backward looking, a reaction against 
modernity, as opposed to ‘old’ nationalist movements that saw themselves as agents of 
progress, building the modern state.  Indeed, the new nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism are ways of mobilising against democracy and openness.  
 
There are, of course, exceptions; nationalist movements in places like Scotland or 
Transylvania aim to decentralise democracy, they are organised in a much more 
participatory way and are much more inclusive, although they have their fundamentalist 
wings. Or there are groups, like in Turkey and indeed Bosnia, who do not necessarily 
claim political power but want to organise society along communal lines  
 
These groups differ from ‘old’ nationalist movements in other respects as well. In some 
cases, like Al-Qaeda, they are organised as horizontal networks rather than vertical mass 
movements, with tightly organised cells. Moreover, they have adapted some of the 
methods of the ‘new’ social movements. In particular, they make use of the media,   21
particularly television, radio, and videos. Videocassettes are a particularly important form 
of dissemination; cassettes of Bin Laden’s speeches circulate throughout the Middle East. 
And they organise transnationally; powerful Diaspora groups often lobby on their behalf 
in centres of power, both national and international. 
 
Religious and national groups tend to be populist and they succeed in reaching out to 
poor people in a way, that neither the ‘new’ social movements nor the NGOs have been 
able to do. Nationalist movements were always middle class movements, especially in the 
nineteenth century. As yet insufficient research has been undertaken on the new 
movements, but it seems clear that membership tends to be composed of newly urbanised 
middle classes, fearful of losing the gains that have come with economic growth in recent 
years. A particularly important group of adherents are young men, students or 
unemployed frustrated by the lack of opportunities and the exclusions of a globalised 
world. Nevertheless, it does seem also that, in many places, these groups and movements 
have succeeded in relaying a populist message and reaching out particularly to the 
countryside. Television, videos and radio have been particularly important in this respect 
in mobilizing a rural population unused to reading. These groups provide a sense of 
ontological security in a society that is rapidly changing although it is a form of security 
based on belief and fear rather than material conditions. 
 
As for human development goals, these neo-traditional groups are mixed. Many 
nationalist or communalist movements are neo-liberal. This is true of the BJP in India, 
Jorg Haidar in Austria or the Northern League in Italy. Many, particularly Islamic groups 
provide social services and humanitarian relief and indeed dependence on these 
organisations is also a method of recruitment. Many are linked to criminal activities of 
various kinds and their socio-economic strategies are indefinable. 
 
Moral and Procedural Accountability of Civil Society Actors 
 
Broadly speaking, moral accountability arises from the mission of the civil society actor. 
Who is responsible for ensuring that the activities are designed to fulfil the mission? Most   22
civil society actors have some sort of procedural accountability, which depends on the 
social composition of the group, forms of funding and the type of organisation. To what 
extent do mechanisms of procedural accountability help to ensure moral accountability? 
All of the civil society actors described above are engaged in a debate about how to help 
the poor and deprived; in that sense they constitute or they claim to constitute a voice for 
the poor and deprived. But the balance of these two types of accountability varies for 
each of the different types and this has implications for the balance of different voices. 
 
The ‘anti-globalisation’ movement is the main contemporary social movement. It is 
composed of a range of groups, social organisations, NGOs, and committed individuals. 
It involves many different voices, ranging from far-reaching radicals, who propose the 
abolition of global institutions or, more positively, the free movement of labour, to 
reformists campaigning about third world debt or in favour of a Tobin tax. The shared 
mission is global solidarity, justice for the world’s poor, though there are many 
differences about this is to be achieved. Although individual bits of the movement may 
have their own procedural accountability mechanisms, the main procedural mechanism is 
rough and ready, as with all social movements – the capacity to mobilise. The movement 
depends on its capacity to mobilise, that is, on the extent, it is seen to be fulfilling its 
mission. Since the movement depends largely on the voluntary energies of those engaged 
in the movement, these can easily be withdrawn. 
 
It is often argued that the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement is largely composed of middle 
class Northern groups, whose ideas do not necessarily accord with those in the South. 
After Seattle, for example, it was said that the protestors were opposing free trade, which 
benefits the third world. It is certainly true that many of the protesters were insisting that 
labour and environmental standards should be incorporated into trade agreements. 
American trades unions were objecting to the import of products made by child labour or 
in sweatshops. Some protesters were dressed as turtles to symbolize the plight of sea 
turtles, an endangered species, killed to meet the developed countries’ rapacious demand 
for shrimp; poor countries like India and Malaysia  do not have the technology to protect 
sea turtles while fishing for shrimp. However, as both third world governments and   23
NGOs pointed out, this linkage between trade and labour and environmental standards 
does tend to penalize the poor countries, who cannot afford to meet the social and 
environmental standards of rich countries. (What if Bangladesh were to refuse products 
from developed countries on account of their responsibility for global warming, one third 
world commentator asked?)  A member of the Indian delegation to Seattle suggested that 
the protesters were hand in glove with President Bill Clinton who was keen to torpedo the 
next round of trade, which would have benefited developing countries and hurt traditional 
Democrat supporters. Clinton, it was argued, was playing to a popular coalition of US 
labour unions and environmentalists who are crucial to the Gore campaign. (See 
Agarwal) 
 
But it is also the case that only a few of the protesters were actually against globalisation. 
Although it is true that the majority of the protesters in Seattle came from developed 
countries, there was a significant third world NGO presence. Moreover, many more were 
reached by Internet; a petition issued on the first day of the talks to protest the way the 
talks were conducted mobilized support from 1,700 NGOs mostly in the third world 
within 24 hours. (See Khor, 1999) 
 
It is, in fact, the case that most of the participants in parallel summits are from 
industrialised countries (Global Civil Society 2001). It is also the case that the 
participation of groups through Internet only reaches a small minority since the poorest 
people, by and large, do not have access to Internet. One reason for the dominance of 
industrialised countries is that the majority of summits are held in Europe. Another 
reason is that the participants are the people who can afford to travel and who are able to 
obtain visas.  After Genoa, an Indian writer from Tamil Naidu, wrote: ‘The fact is, if the 
G8 had been meeting in New Delhi or Africa, it’s possible there would have been a 
million black faces instead of 200,000 white ones. Speaking as an Indian, I am grateful to 
the young white people who represented us.’(Mai Marcel Thekaera ‘The route from 
Genoa’ Guardian July 25 2001)  
   24
Moreover, it is parallel summits that are visible because of the presence of political 
leaders and of TV cameras. But demonstrations on issues of social justice –in Argentina 
against structural adjustment packages, for example, in India or the Philippines about 
dams – are just as large and even more frequent in the South. (See chronology in Global 
Civil Society 2001) 
 
The accountability of NGOs is more problematic. Of their nature, NGOs are self-selected 
and self-appointed. As I have used the term in this paper, they are organisations, 
dependent on outside funding, whose members are committed individuals, often from the 
middle classes. They do not represent the poor and the deprived although their staff and 
members care about the poor and the deprived. A lot has been written about the problems 
of NGO management and internal accountability (Anheier, Lewis, Fowler). There are 
wide difference among NGOs concerning their forms of organisation – formal versus 
informal, hierarchy versus participation, networks versus federations, centralised versus 
decentralisation, not to mention differences of organisational culture. Some NGOs are 
membership organisations; others are governed by boards or trustees. Moreover, the 
meaning of membership varies. In Amnesty International, for example, the members are 
the ‘owners’ of the organisation and determine its decision-making. By contrast, the 
members of Greenpeace are more like supporters passively donating money and numbers.  
 
In my view, funding is critical in determining accountability. For NGOs, which may be 
very large but do not depend like social movements on spontaneous mobilisation, 
sustainability is critical. This may mean adapting to the requirements of official or 
corporate donors, modifying political positions and/or becoming more bureaucratic and 
professional. Or it may mean sustaining a public presence as a way of generating 
individual donations; on the whole this is positive for an advocacy NGO but there may be 
occasions when emergencies are exaggerated, as in the case of Greenpeace and Brent 
Spar, or in the crisis in Eastern Zaire in order to mobilise public interest. A particular 
problem that arises from the financial imperative is the competitive nature of NGOs, the 
need to identify a market niche, and to distinguish the NGOs brand name from others.   25
This contradicts the co-operative practises, which ought to and often do take place as a 
consequence of the normative character of the mission. As David Lewis puts it: 
‘To survive, to-day’s NGO has been forced to become more corporation-like and less 
church-like. Its primary concern, though rhetorically still to actualise social visions, is 
also to cater to a marketplace (of ideas, funders, backers, and supporters).’ (Lewis, p.199) 
 
These are some of the reasons for the growing criticism and suspicion of NGOs 
especially in Southern countries. At one extreme, it is argued that NGOs are merely the 
‘handmaidens of capitalist change’. They are seen as the ‘ modernisers and destroyers of 
local economies’, introducing Western values and bringing about ‘economicide’. (For a 
discussion of this perspective, see Lewis, p.32). It is also argued that by substituting for 
state activity, NGOs bypass formal mechanisms of accountability and reduce the power 
of citizens. Bangladesh, where NGOs have become such important actors, is sometimes 
described as a ‘franchise state’ (Wood 1997). Others suggest that NGOs sometimes 
displace local organisations, diverting funding, and introducing inappropriate poverty 
alleviation strategies (Arllano-Lopez and Petras 1994). 
 
While there is undoubtedly substance to some of these criticisms, it is also important to 
recognise that they only apply to a subgroup of NGOs. There is a wide variety of NGOs 
and a wide diversity of donors. The behaviour of the big institutional donors is not the 
same as, say, Scandinavian governmental donors or private foundations. There are many 
NGOs, especially in the South that have introduced innovative approaches to local 
development, that have helped to empower grass roots groups, or that campaign as part of 
the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement. 
 
The third type of actor is social organisations. These are membership organisations and, 
in so far, as they are concerned about issues of social justice, these coincide with the 
concerns of their members. Thus, for this type of organisations, there is a clear 
correspondence between procedural and moral accountability. Obviously, these 
organisations are sectoral and their concern is with their members not all members of the 
community. Hence their behaviour will depend on the type of group they represent, the   26
coalitions in which they engage, and the dialogue and discussions both externally and 
internally that help to change strategy. The organisation representing the women of 
Srebrenica is interesting in this respect. Initially, it was strongly influenced by the Islamic 
nationalist party, who tried to use the women for propaganda purposes. But over time, the 
organisation has come to recognise that the best interests of its members is served 
through co-operation with other displaced groups, even if they come from different 
nationalities (Freizer and Kaldor, 2001). 
 
The fourth actor is national and religious groups. Of course, there are religious groups 
like Christian Aid or the Aga Khan Foundation, whose behaviour is not different from 
other NGOs. But my concern is with so-called neo-traditional groups, even though these 
are not really traditional; they are often groups that have reconstructed tradition in the 
context of globalisation. The mission of these groups is national or spiritual and 
presumably, this reflects the concerns of its members. But forms of procedural 
accountability are murky. Typically, these are vertically organised, under the leadership 
of individuals, spiritual and/or charismatic leaders. These are communitarian movements, 
where the community comes before the individual and where there is not much space for 
individual influence in determining the overall interests of the community. Particularly, 
in the case of religious groups, these interests depend on scriptural interpretations of 
priests and mullahs. In addition, funding imperatives may allow for disproportionate 
influence from particular groups, in the Diaspora, for example, or for the justification of 
action that may not seem to accord with the mission –drug trading, for example, or loot 
and pillage. 
 
It can be argued that during the 1990s, NGOs and national and religious movements were 
the strongest actors in civil society. The anti-globalisation movement only became 
significant towards the end of the decade. Social organisations were weakened by 
structural change. Both the growth of NGOs and the growth of national and religious 
groups have to be understood as one component of the process of globalisation. NGOs 
were actively encouraged by global institutions as a way of coping with the process of 
structural change. The growth of national and religious movements can be understood as   27
a reaction to the insecurities that accompanied structural change as well as the failure and 
decline of earlier emancipatory project that appealed to ordinary people like socialism or 
post-colonial nationalism. However, as I have argued, these two types of civil society 
actors are the least accountable to the poorest people. 
 
What then can be done to increase the accountability of civil society actors to the poorest 
people, to enhance the ‘voice’ of poor people in the global public sphere? Some 
preliminary ideas are suggested by this survey of civil society. 
 
First it is important for global institutions, international institutions and governments, not 
to privilege NGOs in debates about social justice. NGOs are the respectable end of civil 
society; they can engage in the institutional discourse and indeed can contribute 
knowledge and ideas. Dialogue with social movements and social organisations is a way 
to increase the voice of poor people, even though such a dialogue is more difficult and 
contentious. NGOs find it much easier to use the discourse of the institutions and, for this 
reason, are able to act as interlocutors for other civil society actors but they should not be 
privileged. This difficult dialogue with the anti-globalisation movement was beginning 
after Genoa but has been halted in the wake of September 11; it needs to be revived.  
 
There have been plenty of proposals for a ‘structured voice’ for civil society groups. In 
my view, what is important is not so much the particular forum for dialogue but rather the 
culture of and political commitment to such a dialogue. There is a tendency not to take 
seriously the difficult and radical groups. But it is they who have to be brought in to the 
dialogue even if it involves confrontation rather than civilised conversation. 
 
There is always a problem about who to involve in such a dialogue. But there could be 
mechanisms developed through which the various civil society groups decide themselves 
who should ‘represent’ them, rather than having the institutions pick and choose. This 
does not preclude handpicked participants at seminars or workshops designed for 
particular purposes. But it would mean that the core of the dialogue would be initiated 
through a bottom-up rather top-down process.   28
 
Secondly, national and religious groups should not be excluded. They have to be 
involved in a dialogue both with the institutions and with other civil society actors. There 
is a dialogue among social movements, NGOs and social organisations but the national 
and religious groups tend not to be part of this dialogue. How should the neo-traditional 
groups be included? One problem is that their concerns are with religious and national 
goals not with human development. Herein lies a dilemma. What if it turns out that the 
poor want Islamic rule, say, rather than human development?  That viewpoint has to have 
space to be expressed. Those of us who have faith in reason, would argue that, given a 
free communicative space, a conclusion would be reached favourable to human 
development. However excluding that viewpoint could lead to its opposite –the spread of 
oppressive national and religious regimes.  
 
The other problem about including the neo-traditional groups is the absence of internal 
democracy. If the neo-traditional groups are asked to choose who speaks on their behalf, 
it will be the ‘reliable’ people in leadership positions not those who might be swayed by 
discussion. This is why it is so important that a dialogue among civil society groups take 
place, since these groups are more able to engage the grass roots than governmental 
institutions. 
 
Thirdly, mechanisms need to be developed to regulate the activities of NGOs. NGOs do 
have important skills and experience to offer and it would be a pity if disenchantment 
with the accountability process reduced their role in development and relief. There have 
already been many proposals in this vein in the NGO management literature. Michael 
Edwards, in particular, makes useful suggestions for self-regulation, while Anheier 
emphasises the importance of developing grievance mechanisms.   
 
One important way to increase the accountability of NGOs is through the funding 
process. Would it not be possible to go beyond dialogue and involve poor people directly 
in the funding process? Porto Alegre in Brazil offers an interesting example of ways in 
which community groups can be brought into the budgetary process, not as a substitute   29
but as a supplement to formal processes. One way to reconcile the moral and procedural 
accountability of NGOs is to involve the people they are trying to help directly in the 
funding process. As stated above, diversity of funding is important; the individual donor 
who finds an innovative project must not be discouraged. But big institutional funders 
could try to develop ways in which part of the money they disburse is controlled by the 
people they are supposed to help. How this would be done and how the people would be 
chosen could be part of the dialogue. 
 
Thirdly, social organisations representing poor people need to be strengthened. This is 
not necessarily a matter of funding but rather of empowerment both through increased 
dialogue and through helping to extend membership through enabling mechanisms, like, 
for example, the spread of Internet access. 
 
Finally, the issue of violence needs to be addressed. Violence is unfortunately a form of 
voice. It is also a way of suppressing voice. In Seattle, Prague and Genoa, violence 
catapulted the anti-globalisation protests into the public eye and acted as a kind of shock 
tactic to donors and corporations. There are plenty of similar examples elsewhere.  In 
Kosovo and Macedonia, for example, the issue of Albanian rights was not taken seriously 
until guerrilla groups appeared on the scene. Since September 11, much more attention 
has been paid to Islamic grievances.  On the other hand, violence discredits moderate 
voices. Violence is polarising and squeezes those who seek more democratic ways of 
expressing discontent. Violence has to be dealt with not just through criminal procedures 
but also through strengthening non-violent forms of voice. How this can be done needs to 
be part of in the dialogue. 
 
One of the reasons that there is less trust in politicians and elected officials is that debates 
at a national level no longer determine policy, that important decisions that affect every 
day life are taken at both global and local levels. How is it possible to develop 
mechanisms through which the poorest people feel they have a say in how these decisions 
are taken? Civil society is not a substitute for formal democratic processes; rather it is a 
way of strengthening the substantive character of democracy. It involves the construction   30
of a political culture at a global, as well as national and local levels, through which those 
who are formally responsible for making decisions are more sensitive and responsive to 
the needs and concerns of the poorest people.  
 
Civil society has become the buzzword of the 1990s but it has tended to be equated with 
NGOs. I have tried to argue that other types of civil society groups and other 
understandings of civil society need to be taken seriously as well. In the wake of 
September 11, this is no longer just a goal to be pursued by those who care about the 
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